This talk addresses two important problems in the philosophy of perception: (i) what are illusions? and (ii) how is it that, despite only partial aspects of a perceived object being given to me, I nevertheless perceive the object in its entirety? Phenomenologists inspired by Husserl tend to approach these problems by appealing to the idea that appearances are subjective—that is, they are (or can be understood in terms of) experiences. On this view, illusion is a perceptual error, and perceptual completion is a cognitive achievement.
After introducing the Husserlian notion of subjective appearance, I highlight three limitations that, I argue, affect this view. This, in turn, allows me to introduce a radically different notion of appearance developed by phenomenological realists such as Beck, Reinach, and Scheler, among others. According to these authors, appearances are not subjective but objective. I elaborate on the notion of objective appearance as a particular kind of relation and argue that, on the basis of this understanding, we can resolve the two aforementioned problems without incurring in the limitations of the previous view: (i) illusions are not perceptual but doxastic errors; and (ii) the problem of perceptual completion is avoided, as a phenomenology of perception that operates with the notion of objective appearances simply does not generate it.
16.10.2025
16.00
Heinrichstraße 26, 8010 Graz, SR 09.53 (fifth floor)